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SOME RECENT THEORIES OE ATTENTION 
IN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY 
Whan the subject of "Some Recent Theories of At-
tention in American Psychology11 was suggested, the auth-
or had no idea of its possibilities, nor of the diffic-
ulties that would be encountered. He had devoted most 
of his previous study in this subject to the so-called 
"facts of attention11 and had paid very little attention 
to the theoretical aspects of the subject. However, af-
ter the full significance of the problem became apparent^ 
the subject proved both fruitful and interesting. 
The author found some difficulty in his work owing 
to the fact that the American psychologists seem inclin-
ed to lean upon the foreign psychologists, and to draw 
their conclusions with reference to them. Indeed, some 
of them, as for example, Munsterberg, have gone so far 
as to write their works in a foreign tongue. Even when 
they, themselves, wrote in English, their frequent ref-
erences to these foreign authors, which the present 
author is unable to read, made the articles less profit-
able than they would have been had they been written as 
articles intended solely for an English reading public. 
This difficulty was not experienced in all, however, as 
some of the authors, when they referred to a foreign 
psychologist, were careful to explain the foreigner's 
viewpoint so that recourse to the original, or knowledge 
of French or German was not necessary. Among these Pill-
sbury was very helpful, not only on his own account, but 
on account of the assistance which his explanation of 
foreign views gave in understanding the discussions of 
American psychologists r̂ho were less careful. 
Another source of difficulty was encountered on ac-
count of a shifting and oftentimes obscure use of terms* 
It seemed as if the authors oftentimes were sacrificing 
clearness in an attempt to appear scholarly. In other in-
stances, the authors, although trying to keep to a tech-
nical usage of terms, would allow themselves to drift 
into a more or less popular usage. This was especially 
true of the words interest and will. 
Again, the same author apparently holds one view in 
one place and another view in some other article, or 
even in a different place in the same article. I will 
speak of this in reference to Angell. This made it hard 
to arrive at the exact theory which the psychologist ad-
vocated. Calkins seems to have encountered the same dif-
ficulty in her study for she says in her introduction to 
a discussion of the theories of attention: "It is almost 
correct to say that no one theory has the undivided sup-
/ 
port of even any one scholar." That psychologists have 
had the same difficutly in declaring just what theory 
was advanced by foreign psychologists may be seen by a 
comparison of Baldwin and Pillsbury, for example. In his 
dictionary*Baldwin lists five theories of attention, a-
mong which are the "psychical energy and original act-
ivity theories", to which class he assigns Wundt, and 
as another class, the "inhibition theories." Pillsbury, 
on the other hand, would seem, in the opinion of the 
present author, to lay sufficient stress upon Wundtfs 
theory of inhibition, as for example, when he says "..he 
inclines to the opinion that it is safer to regard the 
entire process as one of inhibition", to warrant the as-
sumption that Wundt would be placed in the class of be-
lievers in the "inhibition theories." In fact, when the 
author attempted to make a classification of theories 
into which he could fit those of the various authors, he 
found that he was unable to do so. There seemed to be too 
. . . . . . 
1. Calkins—Introduction to Psychology, p. 486. 
2. Baldwin—Dictionary of Psychology and Phil-
osophy. Subject "Attention.". 
3. Pillsbury—Attention, p. 241. 
much overlapping ground. It was thought wise, therefore, 
to lay aside any such attempt and to take up the subj-
ect in the following manner: A number of the best known 
(the author will not take the responsibility of deciding 
who is the greatest) American psychologists, from Wil-/ * 
liam James to Knight Dunlup have been studied with ref-
erence to their treatment of the subject of attention aid 
related subjects. In a separate chapter for each one, 
the author will attempt to present, as he understands 
them, the various theories of these psychologists, with 
some criticism or comment in each chapter. In a conclud-
ing chapter he will try to show, if possible, that the 
views of psychologists have been changing, and, in the 
main, along what lines, and as a final conclusion, he 
will present his own theory of attention. No definite 
conclusion can be reached, but a theory will be advanced 
which, in the opinion of the author, seems as well 
grounded as any so far studied. 
The problem of attention, as the author views it, 
involves one large question around which center many 
. . . . . . 
1. James—Principles of Psychology . (1890). 
2. Dunlap—A System of Psychology. (1912). 
smaller ones. This is the question of the nature of at-
tention. All acknowledge that there is a state of clear-
ness in attention, hut the question as to whether this 
clearness is due to an increase in intensity, an inhibi-
tion of competing sensations or ideas, or a combination 
of both, is still an open question. Again, the relation 
of interest to attention is not decided. Is interest a 
condition of attention, or is it caused by attention? Or 
is it merely an accompaniment of attention? Similar ques-
tions may be asked in regard to the feelings, and the 
motor adjustments. Has attention a psychic or a physiol-
ogical basis? These and other questions concerning the 
nature of attention are discussed by different authors, 
and will be treated in this paper. 
An attempt has been made to roughly group the auth-
ors chronologically in order to see, if possible, if 
there is any growth in theories according to time. Since* 
however, the authors are all of practically one short 
period of twenty-five years, such grouping will doubt-
less seem arbitrary and of little value. 
WILLIAM JAMBS 
In a discussion of the theory of William James it 
is perhaps best to take up first his theory in regard 
to the clearness of attention. This, if the writer has 
interpreted him correctly, is believed to be due to a 
real increase in intensity. A few quotations will illus-
trate this: 11 It must be admitted that to some extent 
the relative intensity of two sensations may be changed 
/ 
when one of them is attended to and the other not"; "In 
the face of such facts it is rash to say that attention 
cannot make a sense impression more intense." These 
quotations leave no doubt as to James1 theory in this 
regard. As this question will be taken up as a general 
topic for discussion in the concluding chapter, any crit-
icism of it will be deferred until then. 
In regard to the place the muscular adjustments 
play in attention, there is little doubt but that James 
would consider them the accompaniments of, or an effect 
of attention. For example, he says: "Any object if im-
. . . . . . 
1. James—Principles of Psychology, p. 426. 
3. Ibid, p. 425 ff. 
mediately exciting, causes a reflex accommodation of the 
sense-organ, and this has two results—first, the obj-
ects increase in clearness; and second, the feeling of 
activity in question. But in intellectual attention sim-
/ 
ilar feelings of activity occur." This quotation not 
only points out that these motor activities arise as a 
result of the excitation by the object or idea attended 
to, but indicates that James would make clearness not 
the attention, but an attribute of attention. In his viav 
of the relation of the motor activities to attention 
James has, in the opinion of the writer, come very near 
the true relation. The return effect which the arousal 
of these motor activities has, however, should be in-
cluded, and was by several writers who will be treated 
later. 
James has not made exactly clear just what he means 
by interest. He says, "The things to which we attend are 
said to interest us. Our interest in them is supposed z. 
to be the cause of our attending"; and again, "Volun-
tary attention is always derived; we never make an ef-
. . . . . . 
1. James—Principles of Psychology, p. 416. 
3. Ibid, p. 435 ff. 
fort to attend to an object except for the sake of some 
/ 
remote interest which the effort will serve11, hut he does 
not tell us what this interest is. He did, seemingly, 
give a hint as to its nature when he said: "the only 
things which we commonly see are those things which we 
preperceive", but he upsets this hint when he discusses 
the effect vs the cause theory,3 and leaves nothing to 
take its place. Had he left this idea he would, as the 
present writer believes, have come very near the truth, 
and would have accorded very closely with the more rec-
ent psychologists. In fact, his discussion of the "en-
emy's" views in regard to the effect theory would lay a 
very good groundwork for a theory of interest, as, for 
instance, when he says, "the object again takes the in-
itiative and draws our attention to itself, not by reas-
on of its own intrinsic interest, but because it is con-
nected with some other interesting thing. Its brain 
process is connected with another that is either excit-
ed, or tending to be excited, and the liability to share 
• . • . . . 
1. James—Principles of Psychology, p. 416. 
2. Ibid, p. 444. 
3. Ibid, p. 448 ff. 
the excitement and become aroused is the liability to 
f 
preperceptidm in which the attention consists"; and,"We 
easily see now why the lover's tap should be heard—it X. 
finds a nerve center half ready in advance to explode." 
But these quotations are from a theory which James 
rejects. He does not give attention a physiological bas-
is, but says there is a something, a "star performer", 
which decides what shall be attended to. This something 
he calls a spiritual force, concerning which he says, 
"I count myself among the latter (the believers in a 
spiritual force) but as my reasons are ethical they are 
hardly suited for introduction into a psychological 
work. The last word of psychology here is ignorance, 
for the 'forces1 engaged are certainly too delicate and i 
numerous to be followed in detail." James thus places 
himself against the view which many recent psycholog-
ists hold and the one which will be advanced in the con-
cluding chapter of this article. Indeed, he seemed to 
see the significance of a physiological basis, but was 
. . . . . . 
1. James—Principles of Psychology, p. 449. 
2. Ibid, p. 450. 
3. Ibid, p. 454 ff. 
unable to get away from his ethical theory and since 
it did not fit in with psychological arguments, he de-
clares that "the last word for psychology is ignorance." 
JAMES MARK BALDWIN 
While Baldwin asserts that intensity of stimulus tends 
to draw attention, he also asserts that "attention directed 
1 
to a sensation increases its intensity." He further says 
that "attention has the same intensifying influence upon 
the affective states in general as upon sensation." There 
seems to be no hint of any play of inhibition^ of any kind. 
The clearness would seem, then, according to his theory, 
to be wholly one of intensification and better adaptation. 
We find in Baldwin a very interesting view in regard 
to the part motor activities play in attention. The motor 
activities seem to be aroused or initiated by the attention, 
but when once initiated, they, in their turn, react on the 
attention so that it ,eco.es .ore intense. He has TCry 
summed up his theory in this regard: "It is easy to see 
that, when I turn my attention to a sensation, I in so far 
start into more vigorous existence the motor ingredients 
and associations of that sensation. This in. turn tends to ? 
bring out more intensely the sensory ingredients." This 
. . • . . • 
1. Baldwin--Handbook of Psychology, p. 73. 
2. Ibid, p. 76 . 
3. Baldwin—Mental Development, p. 462. 
theory of a circular action has found a prominent place in 
many later theories. For Baldwin it gives the ground for a 
very interesting theory of reflex attention. "The reflex 
attention which follows upon increased intensity of sensory 
excitation may he considered, therefore, in conformity with 
what has already been said, the return wave of revived mot-
or associates; and the increased intensity which follows 
the direction of the attention is due to the direct influ-
/ 
ence of this return wave, by the reverse association." We 
see that Baldwin places much emphasis on the motor aspects 
of attention, but only as an accompaniment or reinforcing 
factor and not as a cause. In this he seems to agree with 
» 
the majority of American psychologists, although the the-
ory of the circular activity of the motor aspect of atten-
tion is not advanced by a great many. It has, however, 
formed a part of the theories of others. 
Baldwin, like James, tells us that interest plays an 
important part in determining attention, as for example, 
when he says, interest "gives a spontaneousness and ease 
to the attention which renders the latter more effective 
and less wearisome to the inner life. Attention to that 
. » • • • ' • 
1. Baldwin—Mental Development, p. 464. 
which interests us does not demand the outgo of mental ef-
/ 
fort," hut, like James, he does not state what this inter-
est is. 
Baldwin seems to belong to the class who would explain 
attention as arising out of associative activities in the 
brain; as the outgrowth of experience. For example, he says 
"Attention is not a fixed thing"; and, "Why should not at-
tention, like everything else, be subject to the changing a 
effects of habit and accommodation"; and, "Attention begins 
to appear about the end of the first quarter year, appear-
ing first in response to bright lights and loud sounds, and 
being for a considerable time purely reflex, drawn here and 
there by the successive impressions which the environment 
makes. With light and sound, however, movements also attract 
the infant's attention very early; and the passage from re-
flex attention to a sort of vague interest seems to arise 
first in connection with the movements of the persons about 
1. Baldwin—Handbook of Psychology, p. 77 . 
2. Baldwin—Mental Development, p. 468. 
3. Ibid, p. 471. 
/ 
him." This would seem to indicate a psychic growth; an in-
crease in attention as the association paths become fixed. 
It is true that Baldwin places much stress upon the motor 
activities, hut according to his own discussions they are 
accompaniments and not conditions. One more quotation may 
he profitable in this regard: "Now we know that the exercise 
of attention involves a large amount of motor process; its 2. 
constant and necessary accompaniments are motor." The real 
condition would seem to be the "set" of the mind or brain, 
due to previous experience. 
There seems to be no definite recognition of the "Spir-
itual force" which James advocates, although he does say 
that voluntary attention "may be defined as a state of act-
ive consciousness due to voluntary mental exertion or ef-3 fort," and again, "Upon observation of ourselves we find 
that attention may be stimulated either from some foreign 
i 
and unexpected source or from the will." Just what this 
will is he does not say, but the writer would not interpret 
. . . • . • . 
1. Baldwin—The Story of the Mind, p. 76. 
2. Baldwin—Mental Development, p. 462. 
3. Baldwin—Handbook of Psychology, p. 71. 
4. Ibid, p. 150. 
his discussions to imply a "spiritual force" apart from the 
body. A theory of the will in connection with attention, 
will be advanced in the final chapter, and it should suffice 
at this point to say that we found nothing which would not 
fit in with this theory. It is significant, however, to note 
the emphasis which these earlier psychologists place upon a 
something which they call the "will" but which they do not 
explain, while a little later the problem of choice is at-
tacked and forms an important topic of psychological dis-
cussion . 
JOHN DEWEY 
Dewey makes a change from the two psychologists just 
treated in regard to his theory of the clearness and intens-
ity. He says, as do the others, that the things in attention 
are more clear, hut he makes it merely a focusing of cons-
ciousness. MSo the mind, instead of diffusing consciousness 
over all the elements presented to it, brings it all to hear 
upon some one selected point, which stands out with unusual 
/ 
brilliancy and distinctness." But this distinctness is not 
one of increased intensity for Dewey for he says: "The dist-
inctness of mental content must be separated from its in-
tensity." In fact, if the author interprets Dewey correct-
ly, it is more a matter of inhibition. The mind selects the 
essential and the unessential are not vivid because there 
is no adjustment to them. In this regard the author thinks 
Dewey has come much nearer the truth than the two previous-
ly considered. 
In the discussions read Dewey says very little of the 
motor activities, but from what he does say, it is to be 
1. Dewey—Psychology, p. 134. 
2. I "bid, p. 147. 
assumed that he would consider them as very important act-
ivities accompanying attention, and possibly as conditions 
of attention. 
Dewey, like James and Baldwin, lays much stress upon 
interest as a condition of attention, hut he discusses it so 
that we may understand more fully what he means. He defines 
interest as "primarily a form of self-expressive activity--
that is, of growth that comes through acting upon nascent 
/ 
tendencies" He also says: "Whatever furthers action, helps 
i 
mental movement, is of interest"; and, "Genuine interest is 
the accompaniment of the identification through action, of 
the self with some object or idea, because of the necessity 
of that object or idea for the maintenance of a self-init-3 
iated activity"; "The genuine principle of interest is that 
of the proposed with the growing self, that it lies in the 
direction of the agent's own growth, and is, therefore, imp-
eriously demanded if the agent is to be himself." Interest, 
then, would seem to arise out of the fact that the sensation 
or idea is of concern to the individual. This theory fits in 
1. Dewey—Interest and Effort in Education, p. 21. 
2. Ibid, p. 20. 
3. Ibid, p. 14. 
4. Ibid, p. 7. 
vary nicely with Dewey's theory of attention. 
Dewey defines attention as "that activity of the self 
which connects all elements presented to it into one whole, 
with reference to their ideal significance; that is with ref-
erence to the relation which they hear to some intellectual 
end. The essential characteristic of attention is, there-
fore, activity directed towards some end. Ultimately this 
end is the self. The various activities of attention are 
"based in the interests of the self, and directed towards 
ends that will satisfy the self, by fulfilling those inter-
i 
ests." This definition should be contrasted with such a 
definition as that given by Titchener and Dunlap, discussed 
later. Attention, for Dewey, is a forward looking adjust-
ment. But the ability to form these adjustments depends on 
past experience. Of the nature of the adjustments he says: 
"The process of adjustment consists in bringing the past 
experiences to bear upon the present so as to unify it with 
those ideal elements which resemble it, and separate it from 
those which are unlike." The words of Dewey are so clear on 
this subject that we can hardly do better than to note an-
1. Dewey—Psychology, p. 133. 
2. I "bid, p. 140. 
3. Ibid, p. 147. 
other quotation from him: "The final fact we learn about 
attention, therefore, is that it is a relating activity, and 
that since there is no knowledge without relation, there is 
none without attention. Attention cannot cease until all re-
lations have been perfectly developed, that is, until all 
objects, events, and minor relations stand out clearly de-
fined in a final unity, and are recognized as members of 
one whole—the self . The self constitutes the ultimate un-
ity of all. We end, therefore, as we began, with the state-
/ 
ment that attention is a self-developing activity." 
As to the developing nature of the self which is being 
related, and how it is built up, he says: "In attention, as 
soon as the mind is brought to bear upon the sensation so 
as to read itself into it and give it meaning, the apper-
ceived content becomes a condition which determines how the 
mind shall act in the future. Every element apprehended and 
absorbed into the mind gets ant ideal existence, and be-
comes the means by which future idealizations, that is, acts 
of attention, are executed." This, then, far from making 
attention the product of a "spiritual force" such as James 
. . . . . . 
1. Dewey--Psychology, p. 148. 
2. Ibid, p. 150. 
advocates, makes it the activity of a growing self. This 
theory of making the attention the act of relating the pres-
ent to the evergrowing self is, in the opinion of the writer, 
a decided advance over the theories advanced by the two 
psychologists previously discussed, and Dewey's theory of 
interest and attention must play any important part in any 
pedagogical study of the subject. Much of Dewey's theory 
will, therefore, find a place in the theory which the auth-
or will advance in concluding this paper. 
GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD 
Ladd would make it plain that for him, there is an 
increase in intensity with attention, for he says: "In 
general, attention intensifies and clears up the content 
of our sensations, ideas, and feelings; and conversely, 
the more intense and clearly discriminated are our sensa-
tions, ideas and feelings, the more do they attract or 
/ 
compel attention"; and, "The focussing of attention and 
its consequent redistribution changes the relations be-
tween the amounts of psychic energy spent in feeling, dis-x. 
crimination, and conation", but on the? other hand, he 
would also seem to believe in an inhibitory effect. In 
this belief he coincides closely with the view of Pills-
bury, although Pillsbury says that the question is still 
unsettled. Two more quotations bearing on the subject im-
mediately in hand may be of interest. He says: "Attention, 
focussed in obedience to suggestion, actually creates the 
3 
sensations", and "If we abstract attention, or the atten-
* • • . 
1. Ladd.—Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, 
p. 75. 
2. Ibid, p. 74. 3. Ibid, p. 150. 
lion is forced to be withdrawn from any particular sensa-
tion or feeling, the latter, by virtue of this withdrawal, 
suffers in strength and clearness of content.1,7 Ladd, theri 
would seem to advance the theory that the increase in 
clearness is due both to an increase in intensity and to 
inhibition. 
In regard to the part motor activities play in atten-
tion, Ladd makes it clear that he does not consider motor 
activities as conditions of attention, but recognizes 
their importance. There is also much similarity between 
his theory and that of Baldwin in that he believes in an 
attention initiated motor activity which, when once in-
itiated, reacts to reinforce attention. Two quotations 
bearing on this topic may be worth while:"The feeling of 
holding our organs steady seems to form no unimportant 
part of the support which the mind receives in its effort 
to give fixed attention. Now, it is by fixation of atten-
tion that the striated muscle connected with the organs, 
both of sense and of motion, is put into this condition 
of physiological tension. It is the return feeling of this 
tension which defines still further the character, and 
serves as the continuous support of our act of attention", 
• . • • 
1. Ladd?-Psychology, Descriptive and Explan ., p.J6 
2. Ibid, p. 67. 
and "If it "be pressed so as to mean that attention is on-
ly the psychical equivalent of muscular strains, the pas-
sive resultant of the sensations which vary in intensity 
as the action of the muscle rises and falls, the statement 
(that every volition acts only upon muscles and through 
muscles) may well be denied. But if it means that in ev-
ery act or state of attention, of whatever kind and in 
whatever degree, motor elements connected with the changes 
in the muscular fibre play an important part, then there 
/ 
is little doubt of its truthfulness." These quotations 
leave little doubt as to his opinion of the motor theory 
of attention. As it appears to the writer, the important 
step which he and Dewey have made in this part of the the-
ory of attention is an emphasis upon the return element 
from the motor activities which attention initiates. 
Ladd, too, makes interest one of the conditions of 
attention. For instance, he says:11. . . .it is also the ack-
nowledged universal rule that men attend with ease and 
effectiveness to what interests them, but only with dif-
ficulty and reluctance, or not at all, to what does notL 
. • • • • 
1. Ladd—Psychology, Descriptive and Explan. p.69. 
2. I "bid, p. 79. 
interest them." This interest he would call a feeling. 
"The word interest is indicative of feeling. To he inter-
esting is to excite feeling. The form of feeling excited 
and connoted by this one word are, however, themselves 
very diverse," and "All excitement of feeling, wrought by 
whatever object of sense or idea in the mental train, 
3 
tends to render such object or idea a matter of interest." 
In this respect, then, Ladd contributes another element 
to the theory of attention—i.e. that interest is a feel-
ing . 
In regard to the activity of the will, Ladd, too, 
differs from James in that he would not have our choice 
the result of a "spiritual force." He says: "All acts of 
attention are indeed acts of the will, but we find noth-
ing of an external being directed, as it were, of attention" 
What does act upon the attention is the ever-growing self 
that we have spoken of before. Although he lays much 
stress upon the words "will", and "voluntary", and "con-
ation", and "self", there seems to be very little differ-. « * • • 
1. Ladd—Psychology, Descriptive and Explan., p.79 
2. Ibid, p. 79. 
3. Ibid, p. 79. 
4. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
ence "between his views in general and those previously 
expressed of a psychic self which is the outgrowth of ex-
perience, which determines the course of attention. Its 
forward looking nature is expressed in his discussion of 
interest:"If we temporarily or habitually exclude these 
things from our attention because we will to take no int-
erest therein, then our will and feeling have been discip-
lined to a somewhat 'unnatural1 activity in the interest 
/ 
of higher ideals." That this will is merely the ever-
growing self in its changing aspects is expressed as fol-
lows: "When it is affirmed that all attention, even the 
most primary, is influenced by conation, it is meant that 
attention rises and falls, is distributed and redistrib-
uted, in constant dependence upon the varying amounts of 
psychical selfactivity which characterizes the different a. 
mental states." 
Ladd makes another advance over the theories prev-
iously discussed in his attempt to connect the physiolog-
ical and the psychical activities. Ladd calls primary at-
tention "a form of psychical energy", but on the next page 
. . • • • 
1. Ladd—Psychology, Descriptive and Explan., p.80 
2. Ibid, p. 83. 
3. Ibid, p. 150. 
he enters into a discussion of the physiological conditiors 
of attention. He says they Mconsist in the concentrated 
expenditure of nervous energy in certain forms of nervous 
processes to the relative withdrawal of energy from other 
forms. In other words, just as conscious attention in its 
most primary form appears as a focusing of psychical en-
ergy upon some phases, or factors, or objects of conscious-
ness, and the relative withdrawal of such energy from oth-
er phases, factors or objects; so do the physiological 
conditions of all attention seem to involve the focusing 
of physiological functions in some of the cerebral areas, 
or forms of nerve-energy, and the withdrawal of such func-
tion from other areas of the brain or forms of its energy" 
This, as it seems to the writer, is the greatest advance 
over the theories previously discussed. It does not seem 
possible to promulgate any adequate theory of attention 
from either angle alone, nor to do as Pillsbury does — 
treat them as entirely independent of each other.More will 
be said of this when we come to Pillsbury. The growing 
character of attention is expressed thus: "It is a prog-
ressively acquired mental function, involving intellect-
s' 
ion, feeling, conation." 
. . . • • 
1. Ladd—Psychology, Descriptive and Bxplan., p.66 
2. Ibid, p. 61 
Ladd, then, is in some respects similar to Dewey. His 
"interest" is a feeling, while that of Dewey is a feeling 
of concernment. He has offered a motor theory very similar 
to that of Dewey and his psycho-physical theory offers 
nothing hut what could very well fit in with that of Dewey. 
It is Dewey1s theory carried a little farther. 
JOSIAH ROYCE 
Royce speaks of the clearness of the content of the 
mind during attention: "If our attention succeeds in any 
case—i.e. if our passing feeling of current interest is 
furthered—the object of interest grows clearer in our / 
minds," but he is not explicity in his explanation of how 
this clearness is brought about. However, a few pages far-
ther on he says: "Active attention is always a highly in-
hibitory function",* and "The physiological accompaniments 
of attention seem to be... (3) the assumption of a 'set1 
of brain which tends to inhibit all movements and habits 
such as would interfere with the satisfaction of the rul-
ing interest"3, from which we would infer that his theory 
is that of inhibition. 
Royce lays very little emphasis upon the motor side 
of attention. He does speak of the adaptive nature of the 
motor activities,* but they seem to be only a minor issue 
with him. 
. . • • 
1. Royce—Outlines of Psychology, p. 261. 
2. Ibid, p. 264. 
3. Ibid, p. 264. 
4. Ibid, p. 263. 
Interest and feeling are closely connected in Royce's 
theory of attention. For him interest is a feeling of rest-
lessness with regard to an object or idea. As Royce puts 
it: "the intsest is not a feeling of satisfaction or of 
dissatisfaction with what the mental state in itself alone 
chances to contain, but with its relation to other states 
r 
or to one's habits." In this respect interest is a condi-
tion of attention. We may, then, say that for Royce feel-
ing—the feeling of interest—is the condition of atten-
tion. "The difference between attention and inattention 
seems to be. one that is largely determined by feeling." 
That this feeling is distinct in its character is expresssi 
thus: "If both pleasure and displeasure tend to make us 
actively attend, what kind of feeling is it that makes us 
inattentive? From our point of view, the explanation lies 
in the fact that active attention involves feelings of 
restlessness, while feelings of quiescence tend to the 
cessation of active attention", and, "we often find pres-
ent in ourselves feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfac-
tion in the very fact that given present states have some 
. • • • 
1. Royce—Outlines of Psychology, p. 261. 
2. Ibid, p. 191. 
3. Ibid, p. 191. 
sort of relation to former states (e.g. are novel or fam-
iliar, are puzzling or comprehensible, have obvious re-
lation to our past habits, or need new adjustments, etc.)" 
It may be either a feeling of restlessness or of quiesc-
ence, if the former, active attention follows, if the lat-
ter, passive attention. 
The question of will is one of attention for Royce: 
"To attend to any action, or to any tendency to action, to 
any desire, or to any passion, is the same thing as1 to 
select1 just that tendency or deed. Such attentive 
preference of one course of conduct, or of one tendency 
or desire, as against all others present to our minds at 
i 
any time, is called a voluntary act>" "The will is, in its 
more complex manifestation^, the attentive furthering of 
our interest in one act or desire as against another.... 
If we attend to this act or desire, we further our inter-
est in it"; and "The furthered interest, if intense enough 
therefore, means on the physical side, that the form of 
activity in which we are interested gets an actual outer 
. . . . 
1. Royce—Outlines of Psychology, p. p. 259 
2. Ibid, p. 368 . 
3. Ibid,.,p. 368. 
expression just as soon as our attention sufficiently pre-
fers the thought of this act to the thought of any other 
/ 
act"; and "actually to will a given act is to think atten-
tively of that act to the exclusion or neglect of the rep-
resentation or imagining of any and all other acts." That 
this will is dependent on the growing self before alluded 
to., is expressed in the following quotations: "We can nev-
er consciously and directly will any really novel course 
of action. We can directly will an act only when we have 
before done that act, and have so experienced the nature 
of it. The will is as dependent as the intellect upon our 
past experience"; "What can be done for us is to organize 
our planlessly numerous inherited instincts in such fash-
ion that there shall result valuable and consciously dir-
y 
ected habits"; "The involuntary conduct must precede the 
voluntary; but the right sort of involuntary conduct can 
only be established through appeals to the feelings*, and 
through fitting objects of knowledge to the intellect-" 
. • • . 
1. Royce—Outlines of Psychology, p. 268-9. 
2. Ibid, p. 369. 
3. Ibid, p. 369.. 
4. ,Ibid, p. 373 5. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
This theory of the will is of great pedagogic value as it 
points out to the teacher the line of approach to his pup-
ils . 
Going hack to the nature of attention, if, for Royce, 
is a process of adjustment or relating. Interest arouses 
the need of this function, attention is the performance of 
it. Royce has expressed this in a rather compact way: 
"When I attend to a thing I either try to recognize or to 
understand it, or I take contentment in an already exist-
ent recognition or understanding of it, and dwell on it 
accordingly. Attention is called active in so far as the 
feelings of restlessness which accompany our trying to 
recognize or to understand predominates, or are at any 
rate prominent, amongst the feelings present at the moment 
of attention. But when the other phenomena of attention 
are present, while the predominant feelings are those of 
/ 
quiescence, the attention is called passive." This, then, 
would explain why active attention may become passive. 
Whenever the restlessness passes over into a feeling of s 
satisfaction or quiescence, the passive attention will 
follow. This theory is valuable as leading up to the ad-
justment theory of Judd which will be discussed later. 
• . . * 
1. Royce—Outlines of Psychology, p. 261. 
Royce treats of the physiological conditions of at-
tention as follows: "The physiological accompaniments of 
attention seem to he of three sorts: (l) Adjustments of a 
motor type" (Adaptive) "(2) The assumption of a 'set1 of 
hrain that tends especially to favor those cerebral habits 
which are of most use to us in our efforts to comprehend 
objects of the kind wherein we are interested (3) In 
close connection with (2) the assumption of a fsetf of 
brain which tends to inhibit all movements and habits 
such as would interfere with the satisfaction of the ru.1-
j 
ing interest." 
Royce makes attention dependent on the association 
processes of the brain^ Its relation to the growing self 
is thus expressed: "The organic conditions which accomp-
any active attention tend toward the persistent bringing 
before consciousness of certain ideas. The result of the 
continued influence of such a process is the constant 
moulding of our relations to our environment and of our 
habits, in such wise that certain mental combinations ap-
pear, which would otherwise have been impossible." Royce, 
. . . • 
1. Royce—Outlines of Psychology, p. 263-4. 
2. Ibid, p. 329. 
3. Ibid, p. 330. 
in the opinion of the writer, has come closest to the true 
theory of attention of any studied up to this point. He 
has possibly not placed sufficient stress upon the motor 
aspect, hut that he has recognized it has been noted. This 
much of Ladd's theory could be placed in Roycefs theory 
without change in other respects. 
MARY WHITOK CALKINS 
Calkins does not make clearness and intensity synon-
ymous. ftThe truth is, therefore, that intensity is not i-
dentical with clearness, that is with elemental attention* 
"and sense intensity differs utterly, as we have seen, 
from clearness, the attention element." But she does not 
explain how the clearness is brought about. 
In regard to the motor activities she considers them 
as accompaniments of attention and not in any sense its 
condition. In introducing her discussion of a number of 
theories among which are the motor theory and the affect-
ion theory, she says: "The theories of attention which 
will next be considered are alike in that they mistake—in 
the opinion of the writer—the frequent accompaniment or 
result of attention for the attention." That the motor act-
ivities are important she expresses thus: "The constancy 
of the motor accompaniments of attention makes it highly 
probable, also, that outgoing fibres function in attention 
But these statements also leave clear the fact that she 
makes them only the accompaniments and not the conditions 
of attention. . . . . 
1. Calkins—Introduction to Psychology, p. 142. 
2. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
Interest, for Calkins, is not a condition of atten-
tion, but is made synonymous with it. A few quotations to 
this effect are here given: "The term 'interest1 is best 
i 
used as a synonym for involuntary attention11; "The term 
1 attention1 is a psychological synonym of the expression 
'interest1 . To be attended to means precisely to be inter-
esting. The common theory, that uninteresting things may 
be attended to is, therefore, in the opinion of the writer 
entirely erroneous." In this last statement, while her 
conclusion that the uninteresting cannot be attended to 
seems to be correct, she has, it seems, missed the true 
cause—i.e. interest as a condition of attention. 
Again, Calkins would not make affection a condition 
of attention. She renounces the affective theory in at 
3 
least two different places. In the quotation above quoted 
she says that those advocating the affective theory have 
mistaken an accompaniment, or result, of attention for at-
tention. In another place she says, "It is fair, then, to 
conclude that clearness, or attention in the narrow sense, 
is not identical with pleasantness or unpleasantness, that 
• . . • 
1. Calkins--First Book in Psychology, p. 103. 
2. Calkins—Introduction to Psychology, p. 137. 
3. This paper, p 
is to say, that it is no affective experience"; "In the 
opinion of the present writer, it is untrue to introspec-
tion to insist that the attended to is invariably pleasant 
or unpleasant, though it is unquestionably true that at-
tention is often affectively toned." 
Calkins advocates the association theory of attention 
Stated briefly in her own words it is as follows: "atten-
tion not as due to the functioning of sensory or motor 
cells and fibres, but as due to the activity of the cells 
j 
and fibres in the so-called association centres"; "The 
theory of this book belongs, in a general way, to this 
third group—that is to say the conception of a relational 
attention element, clearness, implies as corollary the 
hypothesis that one of the association centres of the brail 
is excited in attention. The constancy of the motor accom-
paniments of attention makes it highly probable, also, 
that outgoing fibres function in attention. In the opin-
ion of the present writer, our knowledge of brain condi-
tions warrants only some such tentative and general the-
. . • • 
1. Calkins--Introduction to Psychology, p. 488 
2. I "bid, p. 490. 
3. Ibid, p. 491. 
ory of the cerebral conditions of attentionIn this we 
helieve that Calkins has correctly diagnosed attention whan 
she connects it with the association processes, but if the 
writer is not mistaken, she has missed the true theory of 
attention as an adjustment•activity. 
1. Calkins--Introduction to Psychology, p. 491 
JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL 
Angell does not commit himself on the question of the 
nature of the clearness in attention. He does say:11 This 
fact that consciousness always has a focal point which re-
veals the momentary activity of the mind, is what is meant 
/ 
hy the fact of attention", and, "Apparently the psycho-
physical organism selects from' the wide range of potential 
objects, those special ones which shall receive attention 
and so come to consciousness." But he does not say wheth-
er this will result in a difference in intensity or not. 
If we were to make our own inferences from these quota-
tions, however, since it is a concentration on certain 
factors, we would assume that his view would he one of re-
inforcement or increased intensity. 
Concerning motor activity he says: "In normal sensory 
attention muscular movements seem always to he concerned. 3 
These movements are accommodatory"; "Psychologists have 
observed a similar kind of muscular accommodation when 
our attention is directed to intellectual processes"; "The 
• . • • 
1. Angell—Psychology, p. 81 
2. Ibid, p. 84. 
3. Ibid, p. 99. 
4. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
motor activities which accompany processes of attention 
necessarily, at least in the case of the voluntary mus-
cles, send hack to the cortex sensory impulses which may 
then enter into the general field of consciousness to mod-
i 
ify its complexion and tone"; "After what has "been said it 
is, perhaps, unnecessary to insist that motor processes 
are hound up in an inextricable way with the movements of 
attention, both as leading up to its effective activity 
and as secondary consequence of its operation." Prom these 
quotations it is to be inferred that Angell would look up-
on motor activities as initiated by attention, but when 
once initiated, as having a return effect upon attention. 
In this his theory very much resembles that of Baldwin 
previously discussed, and seems to be as near the truth 
as Angell gets in his theories of attention. 
Angell does not speak of interest a3 a condition of 
attention. In fact he constantly shifts his ground. It 
seems as though he is tied down to the popular idea that 
there is a will which determines our attention. He is very 
emphatic in his advocacy of a voluntary and involuntary 
an4--4«voiun±a^ kind of attention, yet when he discusses 
. • • 
1. Angell—Psychology, p. 102. 
2. Ibid, p. 102. 
attention he seems to he unable to get away from what, to 
the present writer, seems to be the true state of affairs. 
The following quotations taken alone would make us think 
that Angell whole-heartedly adopted the popular concept-
ion of a will controlling everything: "A more satisfactory 
division, which we shall adopt, adds one more class and 
recognizes (a) voluntary, (b) non-voluntary, or spontan-
/ 
eous, and (c) involuntary attention"; "Whenever we attend 
to anything because we explicitly will to, we are exer-
cising voluntary attention"; "That we are capable, within 
certain limits, of thus directing our mental activity 
wher^ever we will is one of the easiest facts to verify 
3 
introspectively"; "Meantime, we must admit that it is in 
voluntary attention that consciousness raises the human 
being into the greatest freedom from mere routine, with 
the greatest independence from mere temporary surround-
i 
ings." On the other hand, if we take the following quot-
ations as expressing his theory we have him falling very 
closely in with those theories which we have, in the main, 
« • • • 
1. Angell—Psychology, p. 85. 
2. I "bid, p. 85. 
3. Ibid, p. 85 
4. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
endorsed: nTo direct one's thoughts involves the posses-
sion of purposes and plans, however rudimentary, and these 
are the outgrowth of experience and relative maturity" 
"Apparently the psycho-physical organism selects from the 
wide range of potential objects, those special ones which 
shall receive attention so that they come to consciousness* 
"That is to say, the organism contains within itself cert-
ain ends to be attained in course of development by ad-
3 
justive means"; "The statement is often made that the dev-
elopment of volition is neither more nor less than a proc-
ess of reducing our impulses ta order, and that a mature 
character is simply one in which the impulses are thus 
subordinated to some systematized principle. . .This view is 
unquestionably correct in its general implications"; "In-
deed, volition as a strictly mental affair is neither more 
nor less than a matter of attention." These quotations, 
then, leave us in the dark as to his real theory. Taking 
everything into consideration, however, it seems as though 
he is merely slipping back into a popular theory of will 
when he emphasizes his volitional theory and that he 
. * . • 
1. Angell—Psychology, p. 85. 
2. Ibid, p. 84. 
3. Ibid, p. 92 
4. Ibid, p. 430- 5. Ibid, p. 402. 
should he given credit for his more modern conception of 
will as merely an expression of the growing self. This 
fits in more closely with his theory of attention as a re-
lating activity. 
Angell1s theory of attention is perhaps best expres-
sed in his reason for fluctuations of attention. In this 
he says: "In short, so far as attention is really an act-
ivity of the relating, adjusting kind, its work is done 
when the relation between the mind and the thing attended 
to is once established. This is the mental as distinct 
from the physiological part of the adjustment, and atten-
tion must go elsewhere, because it is intrinsically the a& 
justing act itself, and other things are demanding of the 
/ 
organism the same energies of adjustment." He also says: 
"In all forms of attention, then, we find selective act-
ivity revealed. Selection always implies a purposive, for-
ward-looking type of action, and this is precisely what 
attention is in all its forms. It stands for the fact that 
the organism is teleological in its very constitution. 
That is to say, the organism contains within itself cert-
ain ends to be attained in course of development." But in 
. . • • , 
1. Angell—Psychology, p. 95. 
2. Ibid, p. 92. 
-i-a the face of this theory, which borders on the true one, 
what are we to do with such a statement as this?- "JLnd we 
must accordingly conclude that attention is a rudimentary 
i 1 form of conation, or will. This is unquestionably true*. 
In fact, we must leave Angell with the statement that we 
would class him among those who are so closely tied to 
popular and older beliefs that, although they are on the 
verge of conversion, are as yet unable to take the final 
step which Angell outlines but spoils by contrary state-
ments . 
1. Angell--Psychology, p. 82. 
HUGO raSTERBlRG 
Munsterberg, although a professor in an American un-
iversity, has written most of his psychological works in < 
German, and therefore any thorough study of his works Toy 
the present writer, was impossible. However, in his "Psych-
ology and the Teacher" he has advanced some ideas which 
will warrant his being placed in this article. 
He distinguishes very distinctly between vividness 
and intensity. "We said that the idea becomes more vivid. 
We must sharply separate that from the greater intensity. 
We may listen to the faintest tone of a violinist, a tone 
which is hardly audible, and yet which fascinates us and 
takes hold of our minds most vividly, without its becom-
/ 
ing in the least more intense." 
In regard to the motor activities, Munsterberg makes 
them very important. He gven goes so far as to say: "The 
shiftless mind can be most directly forced into service 
by a systematic control of the motor response." And again, 
"The careful adjustment of the motor organs reinforces the 
vividness and clearness of the ideas and the suppression 
of the opposite actions secures the inhibition of the ifit-
• « . . 
1. Munsterberg--Psychology and the Teacher,, p.159 
2. Ibid, p. 167-8 
erfering thought.If/ Motor activity, then, would seem to he 
a condition of attention. In this respect, if the pres-
ent writer is not mistaken, Munsterberg is on the wrong 
track. 
Munsterberg, in this book, lays little stress upon 
interest. He hints at its nature in the following: "That 
which is needed is an engagement of .the attention by mat-
erial which becomes attractive through that which the pup-
t 
il!s own mind furnishes," but this he does not define as 
interest. Moreover, he makes attention wholly subservient OWL £ 
to the will and says in regard to interest:,,".. .must some-
times appeal to the voluntary effort of the pupils to foc-
us their attention on something which has not become at 
3 
all interesting." This, then, instead of making inter-
est a condition of attention, would make it only a second-
ary element which need not even be always present. In this 
view, in the opinion of the writer, Munsterberg has either 
lapsed into a popular use of words which is unjustifiable 
or is far behind the other psychologists of the same date. . . • • 
1. Munsterberg—Psychology and the Teacher, p. 167. 
2. Ibid, p. 
3. Ibid, p. 150. 
In regard to will and attention, Munsterberg reverses 
the statement made by most of the best modern psycholog-
ists, and instead of making will a matter of attention, he 
/ 
says: "Attention is thoroughly a will act." Other state-
ments of the same general import are: "The need of a train-
ing of voluntary attention is the one demand which must 2. 
be common to all"; "Attention grows only through system-
atic and careful training"; "If I try to remember the name 
of a bird which I see and it finally comes to my mind, I 
feel its appearance as the result of my will effort; I was f 
seeking the name and secured it by my own volition-" Such 
a view of attention controlled by a "will" would imply 
that more modern pedagogical methods are wrong. 
Munsterberg, too, would make the act of attention a 
circular activity. In this regard he says: "That adjust-
ing activity which we feel is not only accompanied by 
greater vividness, but leads backward to a sharper and 
clearer view of the object. This clearer view, again, re-
inforces the impulse to the adjusted activity. Moreover, 
it is the clearness and vividness which secures those as-
. • » • 
1. Ifunsterberg-tePsychology and the Teacher, p. 186. 
2. Ibid, p. 171. 
3. Ibid, p. 171 
4. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
sociations in which the idea develops itself. And the rich-
er this development, the more all the opposite ideas must 
he inhibited and crowded out of the mind. But the more 
the opposite ideas are suppressed, the greater the oppor-
tunity for the attended idea to control our reactions .And 
in this way we have a circular movement by which our at-
i 
tention grows from its own resources.11 In this paragraph 
Munsterberg offers the best contribution to the psychology 
of attention, which we found. This circular activity, the 
idea of placing attention in the association centers, and 
the growth of attention through experience are all hinted 
at, and as has been intimated, the- writer believes these 
belong to the trie theory. His main divergence from our 
theory is in his views of will and of interest. 
1. Munsterberg-«Psychology and the Teacher, p. 161. 
CHARLES HUBBARD JUDD 
In his "Psychology", which was the took investigated, 
Judd did not state his views as to the nature of the clear-
ness of attention. The only hint which was found was in re-
gard to the focus of attention. He says: "There may he a 
focus of high attention, or there may he a scattering of 
attention over a wide field without emphasis of any spec-
/ 
ial contents." But this "emphasis of any special contents 
really tells us nothing. 
In regard to motor activities he says: "No man ever 
gave attention without giving active signs of the concent-
ration of his hodily activities on the object of his at-
2. 
tention." But these activities for him are initiated by 
the attention and are in no way conditions of it. 
Although he does not specifically define interest it 
is made sufficiently clear that for him interest is found 
in the associations which experience has built up and that 
it is a condition of attention. This is brought out in 
the following quotation: "The outcome of such a compari-
son will be very largely controlled by the total group of 
. • . ' . 1. Judd--Psychology, p. 19 0-91. 
2. Ibid, p. 190. 
interests which he has built up in his individual life as 
representing the sum total of his personal relations to 
i 
the world." 
Very closely connected with this is his view of will 
and self. In this matter he offers a sharp contrast to the 
one previously discussed, i.e. Munsterberg. While Munster-
berg would make attention the product of a will, Judd would 
make it wholly dependent upon experience. A few quotations 
expressing his views may be profitable: "Perceptual atten-
tion may seem to be a matter of the moment and a matter of 
individual control, but the complete study of its charac-
ter makes it evident that such attention is not a matter 
2. 
of individual choice"; "The truth is that the explanation 
of volition as a part of self-consciousness can be given 
only by a•recognition of those processes of organization 
which have entered into the elaborate construction of the 
concept of the self"*; "The individual self is clear and 
definite in its apparent influence upon the situation, 
just because it embodies in such a compact form all that 
has entered through development into the organized nature 
• • • • 
1. Judd—Psychology, p. 
2. Ibid, p. 3 2 6 
3. Ibid, p. 329. 
of the self"; "...we see again the impossibility of ex-
plaining thought and conduct without direct reference 
to the total development of the individual."' 
This question of the self is closely wrapped up in 
his theory of attention and hence more information will 
be given in discussing it. Por Judd, attention is an ad-
justing, relating activity, connecting the object or idea 
of attention with the experience of the individual. In his 
own words: "Enough has been, aaid to make it clear that 
attention is merely a name for various phases of select-
ive arrangement within experience. The further discussions 
of the organization of experience may, therefore, all be 
regarded as discussions of attention and will serve to de-
fine in full what the term means"; "To say that attention 
is a force capable of making a perceptual selection is to 
fail to recognize the fact that the selection is in itself 
an expression of individual organization and dependent 
3 
upon the individual's past history." As to his theory of 
the cause of attention the following paragraph may be 
worth quoting: "Neither attention nor bodily movements can <f 
be used to explain the other factor of the situation be-
. « • • 
1. Judd—Psychology, p. 329. 
2. Ibid, p. 332. 3. Ibid, p. 193. 
4. Ibid, p. 323. 
cause, as we have seen, attention is always related to the 
organization of behavior, and behavior is, as we find in 
many cases, related in some way to attention. The two must 
be accounted for by some more ultimate fact of organiza-
tion which precedes both. If this more ultimate explana-
tion is neglected, the whole process may take on the app-
earance of an event without antecedent conditions. The int-
rospection of the ordinary observer carries him no far-
ther back than the first stages of attention, and this seem 
to him to be an uncaused beginning. He overlooks the fact 
that the tendencies of his attention are determined by 
the organization of his whole life...He will find unlim-
ited evidence which goes to show that the individual is 
not at the beginning of causes when he commences to pay 
attention and consequently is not justified in attribut-
ing his behavior to attention as the sole or adequate 
/ 
cause"; "It must be recognized that attention is explic-
able only in terms of development, and that consequently 
its influence upon behavior must be explained ultimately 
by reference to the relation of organization to behavior"; 
• . • • 
1. Judd—Psychology, p. 
2. Ibid, p. 
"Attention is not something which is determined by etern-
al conditions. The individual attends because of inner im-
pulses—The strong impression is a favorable condition for 
attention, but the act of attention is an internal re-
3 
sponse." 
The theory as above outlined seems to coincide quite 
closely with the facts as the writer sees them. A little 
more elaboration of the subject of interest would have 
helped out the discussion, but there seems to be no reason 
to think that Judd's theory of interest, if expressed, 
would not be in accord with our own theory. 
1. Judd—Psychology, p. 
WALTER BOWERS PILLSBURY 
Pillsbury says in his "Essentials of Psychology" "thk 
quality of clearness is, however, different from intensity ' 
And in his larger work on attention, he says: "Nowhere,, 
then, can we be sure that we have a case of mere increase 
in intensity rather than an increase in clearness, which 
gives one of several equally intense sensations an advant-
age over the others", but he concludes: "On the whole, 
then, there seems to be no very satisfactory outcome to 
the discussion of the relation between clearness and in-
3 
tensity." He says in another place in the same book: 
Whether the change in clearness is identical with or de-
pendent upon change in intensity is as yet open to contro-
y 
versy." He does, however, seem to incline to a belief 
that there is an increase in intensity in the idea attend-
ed tOf, and also an inhibition of those not attended to. 
Titchener seems, also to so interpret Pillsbury, for he * 
says in this regard: "The tendency seems to be toward mid-
% die ground. Pillsbury, while stating it as undecided, 
seems to take this ground." 4 
. • » • 
li Pillsbury—Essentials of Psychology, p. 106. 
2. Pillsbury—Attention, p. 7. 3. Ibid, p. 9. 4. Ibid, p. 11. a 5. Titchener—Psychol. of Peeling and Attention .p . 212. 
In regard to motor activities Pillsbury takes great 
Plains to make it clear that he does not in any sense con-
sider them as conditions of attention, but as following, 
or concomitant phenomena. He says: "That adaptation and 
attending are concomitant processes is a fact of which 
each one can convince himself upon the slightest observa-
/ 
tion>" "It can easily be seen from introspection, that 
these adjustments follow the attention in order of time"; 
"These movements are all initiated as a result of attend-
ing, and many, if not all, of the movements can be made in 
no other way than by attending to some stimulus." These 
quotations leave no doubt as to his theory in this matter. 
That this view coincides with that of the writer has been 
expressed so often that it needs no further expression. 
Other quotations could be added, but as they all merely re-
affirm what has already been stated, they would be superf-
luous . 
Feelings, likewise, Pillsbury would make as following 
or concomitant with attention. He says: "We see the thing . . • • 
1. Pillsbury—Attention, p. 13. 
2. Ibid, p. 13. 
3. Ibid, p. 18. 
fully before it can give us a feeling tone of any kind, aid 
by that time of course the attending is complete" and 
"Feeling does not seem a necessary condition of attention." * 
Interest, Pillsbury defines thus: "Interest, then, is 
but the objective way of looking at the conditions of the 
attention. It is merely ascribing to the objects proces-
ses and qualities that have their real origin in the man 
himself. Things are interesting because we are likely to 
attend to them; we do not attend to them because they ar» 
interesting." So defined, we hardly understand just what 
is meant by interest. If it is the peculiar state of the 
mind so that "we are likely to attend" then it seems as 
if it would be a condition of attention. For the present 
writer it would coincide with what Pillsbury calls the con-
ditions of attention—i.e. "The conditions of any act of 
attention are to be found in the present environment and 
in the past experience of the individual." However, it 
is merely a matter of definition. Pillsbury seems to have 
hit the nail on the head when he gives the conditions of 
attention. More will be said of this later in discussing 
his theory. In fact, he, himself, says later on: "In the 
. • • • 
1# Pillsbury—Attention, p. 57. 
2. Ibid, p. 287. 3. Ibid, p. 52. 
first use interest is the equivalent of condition of at ten-
tion, and would therefore be cause, attention effect. 
His view of will and attention must be discussed in 
connection with his theory of attention. In the first 
place he defines the conditions of attention as found in 
the present environment and in the past experience of the 
individual^ Will he defines as a selective, forward look-
ing, activity. ttWe must be careful to insist that will is 
no thing or force, but merely a convenient term to desig-
nate the fact that the early and general social influences 
hold attention, thought and action, towards things that 
are permanent rather than to those things that are trans-
ient. It seems that the problem of voluntary action is 
largely, if not entirely, a problem of attention., and a 
complete understanding of attention with its nature and 
conditions will also imply an understanding of movements." 
That the self, which is usually thought of as doing the 
willing, is not a mind apart is expressed thus: "Taken 
together, the self and attention are so closely related 
as to be scarcely distinguishable. Conditions of atten-
. • • • 
1. Pillsbury—Attention, p. 293 
2. Ibid, p. 52. 
3. Ibid, p. 164. 
tion and what we know as the self are for practical pur-
poses identical • The self is an organization of experienc-
/ 
es as a dynamic whole? "The idea of a self, has usually 
"been introduced to explain the fact that mind shows a un-
ity and self identity, and that mental states do not ex-
ist merely hut are known. These facts cannot be satisfact-
orily explained on the assumption of a mind apart from the 
states, but are perfectly explicable if we regard the int-
eracting mass of experience as the self." 
His theory of attention is based upon the associat-
ive relations. He says: "In the circumstances of the hour, 
the general setting of the mind at the time, we have mere-
ly a whole system of paths connecting various nerve cells 
in a condition of tnnus, of slight excitement, that makes 
anything which tends to excite any one member of that 
group take preference over all stimuli which are entirely 
3 
unrelated1!; "We are compelled to assume, then, from our 
present day knowledge of the nervous action and from psych-
ological facts, that attention physiologically, is due to 
the reinforcing and inhibiting effect of one group of 
nerve cells upon another group, which makes this group af-
• • • 
1. Pillsbury--Attention, p. 217 
2. Ibid, p. 217-8 3. Ibid, p. 252. 
fected more easily by impressions coming in from the ext-
ernal world or from other cells in the cortex." A more 
psychical explanation is thus expressed: "...apperception 
is the name for the fact that any event in consciousness 
is different in some degree from what it would have been 
had the preceding history of the individual in question 
been different, while everything else in his present en-
vironment remained the same. Apperception would, then, be 
merely the general name for condition of attention, the 
e 
name for one relation between observed facts." The above 
deals with attention from the standpoint of its,conditions 
which to Pillsbury seem to be the chief point of discus-
sion. One paragraph should be quoted, however, concerning 
its effects: "What, then, from the psychological side is 
an action of each experience upon every other, is from the 
physical side, a modification of the brain tissue affect-
ed in such a way that there is not only 9 present effect, 
but that those tissues will be forever different because 
of that impression, and because of that earlier impulse 
will always exert a different impression upon whatever 
part of the cortex may be at that time in action." 
. . . . 
1. Pillsbury—Attention, p. 259 
2. Ibid, p. 279. 3. Ibid, p. 319. 
Atte ntion, for Pillsbury, seems in one place to be, 
not an activity, but a preparedness for activity. He says: 
"Attention means, then, neither the clearness of conscious-
ness, nor the movements that accompariy the clearing up of 
a conscious state, but fundamentally the condition of pre-
paredness of the individual and the organism that gives 
rise at once to the change in consciousness and to the 
/ 
movements." Yet, talcing his discussions as a whole, espec-
ially considering' his theory of fluctuations as due to 
fatigue and the breaking over into new association sys-
tems,1" we would hardly be justified in taking this as his 
definition of attention. Its exact nature as he sees it is 
perhaps best expressed in his criticism of Kohnfs theory. 
He says of it that it "is to the effect that attention and 
consciousness are identical. This is not far different 
from the conclusion that we have, reached in so far as it 
must be admitted that attention is involved in all cons-
ciousness, and that degree of consciousness and degree of 
attention amount to the same thing. This seems to be the 
main point upon which Kohn insists. If he means, however, 
to do away with the word attention, we should be compelled 
. . • • 
1. Pillsbury—Attention, p. 121. 
2. Ibid, p. 77ff 
to take issue with him. There are peculiar concomitant 
phenomena of the attention process, strain sensations, 
feelings of interest, etc. which are definitely marked off 
from the other conscious process and are hound to receive 
/ 
a distinctive name." 
The main criticism to make on Pillshury is that he 
does not lay enough stress upon the function of attention. 
He seems to represent a half way mark between the theor-
ies of attention as an activity and the theories of atten-
tion as a state of consciousness. In so far, it seems to 
the writer as if he is headed in the wrong direction. Pill-
sbury seems to be very close to the truth when he gives 
the conditions of attention, and when he assigns it to the 
associative processes, but it seems as though, if he be-
lieves in it as having an adjustment or relating function, 
he should have placed more emphasis upon it; and if he 
does not so consider it, which he seems to do, he would 
throw himself open to criticism, whether just or unjust. 
At any rate, its function, if it has one, should have been 
more definitely stated. His conception of the self seems 
to be the more generally accepted one, and certainly the 
one most useful pedagogically. 
• . • ' • 
1. Pillsbury—Attention, p. 292. 
EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER 
Titchener says that "clearness is an intensive at-
tribute in the sense that it shows degrees of more or 
less, but it is altogether different frora intensity prop-
er ... .Indeed, there is no difficulty, whatsoever, after a 
little practice, in distinguishing introspectively between 
the clearness and the intensity of any given mental proc-
/ 
ess" and also that "in the writer's judgment the view that 
intensity is raised along with clearness is the most prob-
2-
able." This increase in intensity must contribute in some 
degree to the clearness. The two quotations above given 
make Titchener1 s view on this matter of whether attention 
increases intensity, quite clear. 
For Titchener the motor and kinaesthetic activities 
are not negligible, although they cannot be essential eith-
er as conditions or as accompaniments. Two quotations make 
this clear: "Looked at from the outside, attention con-
sists of a certain attitude of the body"; and "Is the cons-
ciousness kinaesthetic? Again, not necessarily. There may ie 
a widespread arousal of kinaesthetic sensations, or there 
may be no sensible change in the muscular system"; and "I 
1. Titchener--A Textbook of Psychology, p. 279-
2. Ibid, p. 279. 
3. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
have always regarded and I shall probably always regard 
the motor interpretation of attention as one-sided."' 
Interest for Titchener is an affective state which is 
always present. He says: "It is quite true to say the int-
eresting thing is the thing that attracts attention, just 
as it is quite true to say that the thing which fits in 
with our mental constitution is the thing that attracts 
i 
attention." This would make interest arise out of the 
fitting in with our experience. As further defining inter-
est we will quote: "What is a thing that interests us? It 
is a thing the idea of which is overlaid with affection. 
The affection may be pleasantness or unpleasantness? "Af-
fection and attention come together in consciousness; they 
are back and front of the same state. We do not first v • 
feel and then attend, we feel and attend together"; "A 
thing which follows the lines of our nervous tendencies is 
a thing-to-be-attended-to; at the same time it is a thing-
to-be-felt. But a felt thing is an interesting thing. 
Hence, the thing that we attend to is from one point of 
. . • • 
1. Titchener—Psychology of Peeling and Attention, 
p. 30. 
2. Titchener—Primer of Psychology, p. 82. 
3. Ibid, p. 82. 
4. Ibid, p. 143. 3. Ibid, p. 487. 
view a thing that follows the lines of our tendencies, and 
from another point of view a thing that interests us";' 
"But I cannot grant that we feel without attending. I in-
cline rather to find a fairly close parallel "between deg-
rees of clearness and degrees of pleasantness and unpleas-
antness"; "Attention is, then, that state of consciousness 
that degree of being .consciousness, which guarantees the 
best results of mental labor. When I am keenly attending, 
I am also keenly interested; and interest is a mode of af-
fective experience." But what does this last quotation 
mean? He says that attention is a state and yet speaks 
of "attending" which would imply activity. As it seems to 
the writer, the true conception of attention is as an act-
ivity, and when Titchener tries to define it as a state 
he contradicts himself. Titchener1s discussion of "will" 
involves statements that seem to imply that attention is 
an activity. 
Titchener says that attention may be voluntary, but 
he makes it clear that this volition is merely the triumph 
of one set cf impulses over another, the resources for 
« . * • • 
1. Titchener—Primer of Psychology, p. 82. 
2. Titchener—Psych, of Feeling and Attention, p.3<2 
3. Titchener—Textbook of Psychology, p. 266. 
which victory are within the organism itself. He says: "Our 
nervous tendencies, inherited and acquired, decide what 
we shall attend to, or (in other words) decide what we 
/ 
shall feel"; Active attention "is simply a conflict of 
primary attentions"; "The making of a choice means, of 
course, that the stronger of the two conflicting forces, 
the rival excitatory processes has won the day; and the 
traces of the struggle that persist after the choice has 
been made means that the victory has not been absolutely 3 
complete? "The conflict between working and going to 
the fire may lead to a victory for work in spite of the 
fact that consciousness is more fully occupied by fire 
ideas than it is by work ideas. The nervous system, in 
virtue of its own bias or leaning, has brought up further 
reinforcements on the side of work and these reinforce-
ments have directed or guided consciousness although they y 
are not themselves represented in consciousness." Titch-
ener has, it would seem, hit the nail on the head when he 
would make will a matter of stronger impulsive tendencies 
• • • • 
1. Titchener—Primer of Psychology, p. 85. 
2. Titchener—Textbook of Psychology, p. 272. 
3. Ibid, p. 273. 
4. Ibid, p.274. 
triumphing, but it is hard to understand how he would rec-
oncile this to a view of attention as a mere state of cons-
ciousness. In fact, if the present writer has correctly 
interpreted him, he does not seem to hold to this view 
consistently himself. 
Attention is best defined by Titchener from a phys-
iological standpoint as follows: "Attention to an idea 
probably means, on the physiological side, that the lines 
running to and from the area in which that idea is ex-
cited and the other areas functionally connected with it 
are open, whereas the lines of intercommunication through-
out the rest of the cortex are more or less effectually 
, t 
blocked"; and, "Neurologists are agreed that one nervous 
excitation may influence another in two opposite ways; by 
helping and by hindering, or in technical terms, by facil-
itation and inhibition....It seems plain that the condi-
tions of attentive consciousness are of these two kinds. 
The clearjprocesses, at the crest of the attention wave are 
processes whose underlying excitations have been facilit-
ated. Similarly the obscure processes at the lower level 
1. Titchener—Primer of Psychology, p. 90-91. 
of consciousness are processes whose underlying excitat-
ions have "been inhibited. The attentive consciousness is 
thus conditioned upon the interplay of cortical facilita-
/ tion and cortical inhibition•11 
1. Titchener—Textbook of Psychology, p. 300. 
KNIGHT DUNLAP 
Dunlap says unambiguously: "Vividness is sometimes 
ccnfu Bed with intensity. Hence it is necessary to dist ing— 
uish carefully between the two"; "Changes in intensity, if 
they occur, are purely accidental, and are due to such 
factors as change in position of the ears, or in the tens-
ion of the ear muscles." This leaves no doubt as to his 
view in this connection. 
The subject of interest is given considerable emph-
asis by Dunlap. In fact it would seem to be a condition 
of attention if we interpret him correctly. "Interest is 
sometimes named among the conditions of attention. That 
the feeling we have earlier referred to by the name of 
interest does predispose to vividness the content assoc-
iated with it is indisputable. The same is true of any 
emotion or emotional factor"; and, "A certain amount of 
what, for want of a better term, we may call interest, 
may attach to the object. These factors—pleasure, pain, 
desire, repugnance, interest—constitute the affective 
• • • • 
1. Dunlap—A System of Psychology, p. 295. 
2. Ibid, p. 296. 
3. Ibid, p. 301. 
tone of the object in so far as they are present." This 
would make interest a kind of affection and also would im-
ply that the affections play an important part in atten-
tion, whether or not they are conditions of it. 
The exact nature of attention, according to Dunlap, 
is hard to arrive at. Like Titchener, he starts out with 
the statement that "The term attention properly signifies 
a condition or state of consciousness itself?*but he con-
nects attention with association: "The whole matter of the 
irise of ideas through association is one of vividness. One 
percept or idea occupying the focus of consciousness tends 
to bring in its associates"; "The firmer the association 
between the intrinsically interesting factor and other 
factors, the more these share in the interest." That the 
interest, and hence the attention, are not the product of 
a will, but of the associative centers in the brain is 
expressed in: "But don't forget that admiration and inter-
est, to whatever activities they may lead, are factors in 
the content of your consciousness, and not anything sup-
plied by your consciousness or your ego. Voluntary action 
. . • • 
1. Dunlap--A System of Psychology, p. 242. 
2. Ibid, p. 294. 3. Ibid, p. 299. 
4. Ibid, p. 252. 
consists in holding the attention on a certain content to 
get the maximal effect from consciousness.11' One more 
quotation hearing on Dunlap1 s view of the nature of atten-
tion will he given, then we shall leave this division, 
with a realisation that we have offered little real inform-
ation concerning Dunlap* s views, hut that it was as .much 
as we could get. "Consciousness varies in degree. One ex-
treme of the range of variation is commonly known as a 
high degree of attention, or concentration of attention. 
The other extreme is inattention, to whitfh the term of § 
subconscious is also applied. The general designation of 
attention is thus given only to the higher degrees of 
consciousness. If referred to the content, the degrees of 
consciousness are degrees of vividness, which is sometimes 
called clearness." 
1. Dunlap—A System of Psychology, p. 293. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
As was stated in the introduction, the author has 
found it impossible to classify the psychologists studied 
under any classification such as the one proposed by Bald-
win and others. It seems, however, as if it might be prof-
itable to take a final survey of the whole field before 
entering into a discussion of our own theory of attention. 
In regard to the nature of the increase in clearness 
we find among the earlier authorities much more assurance 
that it is an increase in intensity or that it is an in-
hibitory process. The later psychologists seem more in-
clined to say with Pillsbury, that the question is still 
undecided. In fact, so far as laboratory methods have 
progressed, there seems no way of getting at the exact 
truth with any degree of certainty. Any conclusion must 
therefore be largely a matter of conjecture. 
In regard to the place the motor activities have in 
attention, we find that only one (or if we include Dewey, 
two)—I'unsterberg—is willing to make them a condition of 
attention. If we consider, therefore that Munsterberg is 
a foreigner and writes and reads in foreign literature on 
the subject so much that he has hardly acquired the right 
to be called an American psychologist* we may sat that the 
American psychologists are against the motor theory of at-
tention. A theory has been advanced, however, which seems 
of great importance to us. This is the return effect the-
ory of Baldwin. This theory would seem to account for the 
phenomena which have been observed by the motor theory ad-
herents, and is the form in which the motor theory finds 
iself in American psychology. It is to be noted, however, 
that none of the ones who have been treated as most rec-
ent, have advocated this theory, although why they have 
departed from it is not explained. 
Interest has been defined in almost as may ways as 
there are authors. The majority of them consider it either 
as a condition of attention or as a necessary accompani-
ment, and most of them have in some way connected it with 
the ever-growing self. With a few exceptions the psychol-
ogists have agreed that its importance to attention is 
such that it must be cultivated, and that this is done by 
forming wider associations. Pillsbury seems to have come 
close to the true meaning of interest when he says that 
"it is merely ascribing to the objects processes and qual-
ities that have their real origin in the man himself." As 
such it is a condition of attention and seems to be so re-
garded by moat of the men studied. 
The question of affection seems to take two phases. 
On the one hand there are those who interweave interest 
* 
and affection, either Toy making interest an affection or 
Toy making it conditioned hy affections, and on the other 
hand there are those who have declared positively against 
the affective theory of attention. 
The will and the self seem to have heen a question on 
which many have failed to get at the true facts in the 
case. In fact the popular conception of will is that there 
is a something, a "spiritual force" as James terms it, 
which oversees our activities and controls them. This will 
seems to be the self. For instance in popular terms we 
can say "I will to do a thing." On the other hand, the 
majority of the psychologists studied would make the self 
but the organization of the experiences of the individual 
and the will merely the assertion of the stronger impulses 
within the organism itself. Such an explanation seems to 
work in better with the other theories and the psycholog-
ists who still held to the popular conception of will had 
a tendency to adopt this view when they undertook to ex-
plain some of the phenomena of attention. Angell has al-
ready been cited in this regard. James held to this view, 
while Baldwin, who was the next one discussed, seems un-
decided in the matter. Whenever this view is adopted we 
seem to find contradictions. 
As to the nature of attention, we find that most of 
the psychologists have connected it in some way with the 
association processes. The adjustment theory, after its 
expression by Dewey, seemed to gain favor and was expressd 
in different ways by several. However, the most recent of 
the psychologists seem to abandon the idea, or try to, of 
calling attention an activity, and try to make it appear 
to be merely a state of consciousness, but, as has been 
pointed out, whenever they attempt this they fall into 
contradictions with themselves which seem to argue for the 
theory advocated by the earlier psychologists. It is eas-
ier to think of attention as an activity than as a mere 
state. This is largely a matter of definition, but as the 
earlier definition seems to fit in better with the general 
conception of the term and as the newer definition is no 
more serviceable, it seems to the writer, that there is 
riot sufficient justification for the change in the use of 
the term. 
II. 
We are now ready to advance what seems, in the light 
of the study just made, the most reasonable theory of at-
tention. It should go without saying that while the ques-
tion is still in its theoretical stage with psychologists 
who have ax>ent a lifetime in psychological study, that any 
the cry which we can advance will he but a theory, and can-
n t he established "by evidence which is in any way con-
elusive. It must be advanced, then, merely as that theory 
of attention which seems to the writer to be most near the 
facts. 
In regard to the nature of the clearness of attention 
it seems to the writer as if it were a ̂ matter of inhibi-
tion. When we look at a mass of lines which contain a pic-
ture puzzle, for example, we see all of these lines with 
the same decree of intensity. When we find the picture, 
however, the lines which are irrelevant seem to fade away, 
leaving the lines of the picture clear and distinct. But 
so far as we can observe, they have not increased in in-
tensity. They are no darker or brighter—they are merely 
clearer, due to the fact that the competing lines have 
left the attentive consciousness— i .e • have been inhibited. 
The same effect may be observed at night when all sounds 
are subdued. A sound which could have been heard only a 
short distance will carry a long way. In the state of at-
tention, in our theory, we have a mental state correspond-
ing to this. The idea or sensation attended to does not 
increase in intensity, hut the competing ideas or sensa-
tions are inhibited, leaving the content of attention 
standing out in relief, as it were. 
To us, the motor activities seem to be initiated by 
the attention. In fact it would seem as though there could 
be no such activities unless the attention were first 
gained. There seems no doubt, however, as the writer ob-
serves the facts, but that the motor activities are al-
ways present in some degree. They may never become known 
in consciousness, but it seems that they are always there. 
In regard to the return effect of these motor activities, 
we do not find sufficient evidence in our introspective 
observations to justify us in either advocating or cont-
radicting it. In view of the James-Lange theory of emo-
tions, however, it would seem as if this effect might be 
present to a certain extent, although we must confess that 
we would make the emphasis upon this part of the theory 
very slight. 
Interest, we hardly know how to describe. James says: 
"the only things which we commonly see are those things 
which we preperceive." All along emphasis has been placed 
on the fact that the immediate attention was based on the 
experience of the individual. Attention, in the theory of 
the present writer, is the activity of relating the cont-
ent of attention to this organization of experience, but 
interest is the relation already existing, considered as 
pertaining to the object or idea. For the writer it is 
easiest to consider attention as an associative process. 
But there must already be systems of association present. 
Yfcen we say, then, that an object possesses interest, we 
mean that it is related to one of these associative sys-
tems . 
The place of affection seems to be secondary. We can-
not conceive of feeling before we attend, and hence can-
not see how feeling can be a condition of attention. If 
feeling is present in a majority of cases, or even if al-
ways present, it is because those things which fit in with 
our associative systems are nearly always, if not always, 
overlaid to a certain extent with affection. Again, we 
have said that attention is an activity. Activity of any 
kind, if successful, may give rise to pleasure, if unsuc-
cessful, to displeasure. In this way the very activity 
of attention may give rise to an affection, but we cannot 
in any way see how it can be conditioned by it. 
The will and the self are bound closely together in 
our theory. The self, as we define it, is the sum total 
of the past experience of the individual. Each experience 
altera the organisation in a certain degree and in so much 
the self is changed, and as this self is changed the fut-
ure activities of the individual will be different. In 
our theory, will does not imply competition of impulses, 
although it is doubtful if any activity ever occurs in 
which there are no competing impulses. The stronger im-
pulse may be so strong, however, that the competition will 
be negligible. At any rate the will, for us, is the assert-
ion of some impulse to its right to control the action of 
the individual and there is just as much will where there 
i3 a minimal amount of competition as when the competit-
ion is great. When there are competing impulses, a psychic 
and physiological struggle ensues and when one triumphs 
the impulse which is strongest asserts its control. • 
As has been said before, attention is an activity con-
cerned with associative systems. The object which is able 
to train attention must in some way be related to the as-
sociative systems which have been built up by experience. 
It seems easiest for us to consider attention as the proc-
ess of adjusting the self, as above explained, to this new 
idea or sensation. As a result, it becomes bound closer 
into the system of associations which claim it. This act-
ivity of fixing it in the system is what we choose to call 
the act of attention. In doing this, there seems to be a 
discharge along the motor nerves which result in the mot-
or accompaniments of attention. When two objects or ideas 
claim attention at once, there are competing motor activ-
ities, which may account for the fatigue resulting there-
from. 
This theory of attention is of pedagogic value bec-
ause it lays such stress upon the associative systems. The 
teacher who believes in it will not try to teach the child 
to attend, but will organize the material so that it will 
fit in with the associative systems already formed in the 
child's mind. Any attmpt to make the child study because 
the things are things he ought to know will be abandoned, 
and the teacher will try to establish a connection between 
the child's experience and the material to be learned. The 
attention will follow as a result. The interest is this 
connection and as such is the condition of attention, but 
is itself conditioned by the experience of the individual. 
